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Abstract. In this paper I argue that even the most radical metaphysics of  powers (such as that adopted 
by Mumford & Anjum, Cartwright, or Groff) are compatible with eternalism. I first offer a taxonomy 
of  powers ontologies, and attempt to characterise the difference between moderate and radical powers 
ontologies – the latter are characterised by an emphasis on production and dynamicity. I consider an argu-
ment by C. Friebe to the effect that the productive character of  powers is inconsistent with Eternalism 
and find it wanting. I then elucidate the notion of  dynamicity that radical powers theorists employ by 
making apparent their link with an ontology of  irreducible processes. Finally, I respond to an argument 
by Donatella Donati to the effect that eternalism entails a reductive account of  change which is incon-
sistent with process ontologies, and show that the the two are compatible. I conclude that we have no 
reason to think that radical powers metaphysics (and, a fortiori, every powers ontology) are not com-
patible with eternalism.  
A broadly Neo-Humean conception of  the world, paradigmatically embodied by Lewis’ claim that ‘all 
there is to the world is a vast mosaic of  local matters of  particular fact, just one little thing and then 
another’ (Lewis 1986: ix) has been, at least implicitly, the background world-view of  most metaphysical 
theorising in the last decades of  the twentieth century. Recently, however, this paradigm is being put 
‘under serious pressure within analytic metaphysics’ (Groff  & Greco, 2013: 1) by a rival, broadly Neo-
Aristotelian picture of  reality, spearheaded by the idea that there are real causal powers that establish 
necessary connections between existents.   i
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 So far talk of  powers has been mostly limited to the closely intertwined discussions about laws 
of  nature, (natural) modality, and causation. However, if  powers metaphysics and in general Neo-Aris-
totelianism are to become a serious competing research tradition and hope to replace the dominant 
paradigm, they better show that they can be fruitfully deployed in a variety of  other debates in meta-
physics, as well as other fields of  philosophy (some examples can be seen in Groff  & Greco 2013, 
Mumford & Anjum 2018). If  powers metaphysics turned out to offer a better theory of, say, laws of  
nature, but prevented us to deal with  problems about persistence, mereology, objective chance, emerii -
gence, time, free will and so on, its chances to replace Humeanism would look rather grim, since that 
framework has proved to be immensely fruitful and influential in all those fields.  
 I can see two strategies available to the Neo-Aristotelian: she can either show that some of  the 
theories in these debates, although developed with a Humean background, are compatible with a 
powers metaphysics and can be adopted without many modifications, or she can completely reject the 
options on the market because they are irremediably tangled up with Humean presuppositions and de-
velop a brand new theory about these phenomena. In this paper, I will tend toward the former, more 
conservative option: I aim to show that an ontology of  powers is compatible with an eternalist view on 
the metaphysics of  time.   iii
 The task is rather urgent: recently it has been argued that powers metaphysics is inconsistent 
with any of  the major theories of  time (Backmann 2018, Donati 2018). Evidently, this would be a major 
problem for Neo-Aristotelians. Even conceding the non-trivial assumption that eternalism, moving 
spotlight, growing block, and presentism do not exhaust the logical space for a metaphysics of  time, it 
would put powers metaphysics at a considerable disadvantage – powers theorists would have to build 
such an alternative theory from scratch before being in the position to be an even remotely credible 
threat to Neo-Humeanism. In order to show that powers can adopt an eternalist view of  time, we will 
have to shed some light on some key notions of  Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics – in particular, the no-
tions of  production, dynamicity, and their link with processes.  
 Note that I will be solely concerned with the fact that powers are compatible with eternalism 
because I find the view independently plausible and appealing, as well as for the fact that it would con-
siderably help the task of  offering a satisfactory semantics for dispositions (Vetter 2015: 186-194).  I do 
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not intend to suggest that powers are only compatible with eternalism. Unfortunately, a more compre-
hensive survey on the relationship between powers and others views of  time would exceed the limits of  
a single paper, and will be left to future work.  
 The paper will be structured as follows: in section §1 I introduce eternalism and two varieties 
of  powers metaphysics, which I dub ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’. Radical powers metaphysics differ from 
their moderate counterparts by requiring powers to be also causal, productive, dynamical, and tendential. In 
section §2, I discuss and reject an argument by Friebe (2018) aiming to show that radical powers are 
incompatible with eternalism on grounds on production, and conclude that productivity is compatible 
with eternalism. In section §3., I consider two further objections against productive powers in the eter-
nalist block. In §4, I cash out the notion of  dynamicity by appealing to processes, and I sketch the fea-
tures of  processes which radical powers theorists are committed to. In section §5. I discuss and reject 
an argument proposed by Donati (2018) to the effect that eternalism involves an account of  change 
which is incompatible to the ontology of  processes presented in the previous section. I conclude that 
there is no reason (yet) to think that powers metaphysics cannot be embedded in an eternalist frame-
work.  
1. Eternalism & Two Brands of  Powers 
The goal of  this paper is to show that powers are compatible with an eternalist metaphysics of  time. 
Some stage-setting first: what are these two theories? My preferred characterisation of  eternalism is as 
the conjunction of  the following:  
a. The domain of  the most natural, unrestricted existential quantifier used to univocally express onto-
logical commitment (Sider 2011, van Inwagen 2009) includes present, as well as past and future 
times and entities. Present, past, and future times and entities exist simpliciter.  
b. There is no unique objectively privileged time or temporally located entity. A description of  reality 
can be correct and complete without specifying what time is present. 
c. Times and objects are ordered by relations being before than/being after than/being simultaneous with 
which are true simpliciter and therefore can be specified without mentioning what time is present.  
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d. Tense operators do not change the truth-value of  any existential claim: Always, for every x, x Al-
ways exists. In other words, what exists simpliciter never changes (Correia and Rosenkrantz 2018).  
Clause d. is more contentious than the others, and is far from being universally accepted: there are 
more standard characterisations of  eternalism that do not make use of  tense operators. I think that the 
view of  eternalism resulting from the adoption of  d. is overall preferable, but unfortunately offering a 
detailed defence of  this theory would take us too far astray. In §3, I will present a more standard ver-
sion of  eternalism, which I will dub ‘Tenseless Eternalism’, and briefly examine whether there are reas-
ons to think that Tenseless Eternalism is more problematic for powers ontologies than my preferred 
view, formulated using tense operators.  
	 What about powers? Unfortunately, there is no single, widely shared metaphysical theory of  
powers, nor there is yet a universally accepted terminology, which makes it harder to compare different 
theories. Let’s start with a terminological note: for the purposes of  this paper, I will take ‘power’ to be 
synonymous with ‘potentiality’ (Vetter 2015), ‘tendency’ (Mumford and Anjum 2018), 
‘capacity’ (Cartwright 1989), and even ‘disposition’.  iv
 It is controversial whether powers exist only at the fundamental level or there are genuine non-
fundamental powers – the referents of  many of  our everyday dispositional predicates such as ‘fragility’, 
‘irascibility’ and the like. I will remain neutral on this point – it does not really affect the arguments in 
what follows. Throughout the paper, however, purely for matters of  clarity of  exposition, I will help 
myself  to macroscopic, non-fundamental properties when providing examples of  powers. Note that 
this controversy does not map onto the distinction between sparse and abundant conceptions of  prop-
erties (Armstrong 1978). I will operate under the assumption that both parties have the right to adopt a 
sparse conception of  powers, according to which not all predicates correspond to a property, and will 
assume that all predicates used henceforth do correspond to genuine, ‘ontic’ properties.  
 We can now start to formulate the minimal common ground that all powers metaphysics share.  
The core insight of  powers metaphysics is that powerful properties “point beyond themselves”. 
‘Powers... are properties for some behaviour, usually of  their bearers. These properties have an object 
towards which they are oriented or directed. The objects of  powers are usually called 
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“manifestations”’ (Molnar 2003: 60). From this core insight we can extract the two minimal features of  
powers.  
A. Powers are directed properties: their identity is determined by what they are for.  Powers are not v
quiddities (Black 2000, Mumford 2004, Bird 2007) and have their modal profile essentially (Bird 
2016). From this it follows that their modal profile is necessary: ‘the very same power could not 
have a different dispositional character or causal role: that character or role is fixed across possible 
worlds’ (Bird 2016).  vi
B. Powers are modal properties. Genuine dispositional predicates refer to ontic properties – entities in 
one’s domain. They cannot be reduced to simple conditionals or counterfactuals that hold in virtue 
of  something that is not, itself, a power.  vii
These are the theses that any theory that aims to qualify as a powers metaphysics must accept. We can 
sum the up in the following Minimal Criterion for Powers:  
MCP: Powers are ontic properties whose necessary modal profile holds in virtue of  their nature. 
Insofar as powers and manifestations are distinct entities, any theory that subscribes to MCP clearly 
violates some core tenets of  the Humean world-view, positing necessary connections between them. 
However, some powers theorists – first and foremost, Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum (2011; 2018) 
– maintain that there is more to powers than what is captured by MCP, and that a metaphysics of  
powers should represent a more radical departure from the Humean picture. Consequently, they wish 
to add a number of  further clauses to the minimal criterion. The most important additions are the fol-
lowing:  
C. Powers are productive: they bring about their manifestation by producing it. ‘Powers, we maintain, are 
productive of  their manifestations... [denying this] would do more harm to the metaphysics of  dis-
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positions than good...Powers would have lost their potency and thus would no longer be any use in 
explaining how one thing brought about another’ (Mumford & Anjum 2011: 8).   
D. Powers are dynamic and active. A world of  powers is not a passive mechanism that receives its activ-
ity from an external source, but is itself  the source of  change (Mumford & Anjum 2011; 2018, 
Groff  2013).  
E. Powers confer a tendential, sui generis kind of  modality, stronger than mere metaphysical or natural 
possibility and always and necessarily short of  natural and metaphysical necessity (Mumford & An-
jum 2011; 2018).  viii
Not all these theses are equally radical and need not be accepted or rejected as a package. In particular, 
it seems that one could adopt C. and D. without thereby being committed to E. (e.g. Groff  2013; ms. 
Anjum and Mumford 2018). Call the proponents of  a powers metaphysics that only accepts MCP 
‘moderate powers theorists’ and those that embrace some or all of  C.-E. ‘radical powers theorists’. In 
what follows, I will focus on radical powers theories incorporating at least C. and D. for two reasons: 
they are by and large stronger than moderate theories, so proving that they are compatible with eternal-
ism a fortiori shows that moderate theories are; secondly, because the main arguments to the effect that 
eternalism is not well suited to accommodate powers rely on these stronger theses. This does not mean 
that I will offer any argument to the effect that the radical view is to be preferred to the moderate one: 
I simply aim to show that they are both compatible with eternalism. Now that we have a clearer picture 
of  the views under scrutiny, we can turn to the arguments to the effect that they are not compatible. 
2. Argument from Productivity  
The first objection to the compatibility of  powers ontologies and eternalism concerns the role of  the 
notion of  productivity. Radical powers theorists insist that powers bring about their manifestations: they 
produce them, and it is in virtue of  this fact that powers have explanatory value when it comes to the 
evolution and behaviour of  natural systems. Friebe (2018)  thinks that this creates a problem for the ix
pairing with eternalism. His argument, in short, is that if  powers are to be productive of  their manifest-
ations, then manifestations ontologically depend upon their powers; in particular, the fact that the 
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manifestations obtain at some time t depends on the fact that its power exists at some time t’. However, 
Friebe argues that such ontological dependence is incompatible with Eternalism, for given eternalism, x 
exists simpliciter and it is in virtue of  its existence simpliciter that it exists at t, and thus Eternalism is in-
compatible with the dependence required by productive powers.  
 The argument can be spelled out more precisely as follows, where m is the manifestation-token; 
POT[m](x) is the power of  x for m;  t, t’ are variables ranging over times,  and 𝒯p is ‘p is true simpliciter’.  x xi
1. Powers are productive. If  POT[m](x) produces m, then m ontologically depends upon POT[m](x).  
2. Productivity entails ontological dependence. If  m ontologically depend upon POT[m](x), then m ex-
ists at t in virtue of  POT[m](x) existing at t’.   
3. Eternalism: Truth simpliciter is static. Always, ∀p Always (𝒯p→ Always 𝒯p).  xii
4. Permanentism. What exists simpliciter is static. Always, ∀x Always E!x.  
5. What always exists simpliciter, exists at a time. Always, 𝒯E!x → at t, E!x.   
6. Existence simpliciter grounds existence at a time. If  Always 𝒯E!x, then at t, E!x in virtue of  Always, 
𝒯E!x. 
7. Incompatibility of  grounding. If  at t, E!x in virtue of  Always,  𝒯E!x, then ¬∃y (at t, E!x in virtue of  
y).  
8. Therefore, Eternalism entails that manifestations do not ontologically depend upon powers, so there 
cannot be productive powers in an eternalism framework.  
The argument seems valid. Let’s examine the premisses.  
 Friebe does not offer a precise characterisation of  what notion of  ontological dependence he is 
working with in 1. and 2. Backmann (2018) reads him as using rigid existential dependence, which he 
takes to be unfit for the job because the notion is available to the Humean, too; he therefore proposes 
to formulate the argument in terms of  generic existential dependence (Lowe 2006) plus temporal order: ‘a 
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produced b, iff  b generically existentially depends on a, and a existed before b existed’ (Backmann 2018: 
14). This proposal won’t do: if  rigid existential dependence is unfit because too lightweight and weak 
for the job, so will be the generic existential dependence, which is even weaker.   
 There is no need to think that the notion of  ontological dependence appearing in premisses 1. 
and 2. must be reduced to existential/modal terms, however. We can allow the ‘ontological dependence’ 
involved in production to be a primitive (Barnes 2012; 2018) hyperintensional diachronic dependence 
relation that we have a relative good grip upon and which is not available to the Humean, and leave it 
to radical powers theorists to elucidate the notion further.    
 It could be objected that dependence relations are usually thought to be synchronic, so there 
might be some skepticism to the effect that there could be anything such as the kind of  ontological de-
pendence involved in production, and therefore whether production is a consistent notion to begin 
with.  Unfortunately, addressing this point with the required level of  detail would take us too far xiii
afield; I will offer only three brief  observations. First, although it is common to think that ontological 
dependence relations are synchronic, it is not uncontroversial. Bennett (2017: 95-99) contends that 
causation is a kind of  building relation, and that it makes sense to have building relations that ‘can hold 
over an interval’ (Bennett 2017: 95) — and, moreover, that many other building relations are ‘diachron-
ically tainted’. Insofar as the ontological dependence involved in production can be assimilated to such 
building relations, Bennett’s arguments would open the possibility of  a cross-temporal dependence.  
 Secondly, although Friebe assumes that the token-manifestation occurs at a distinct, and pre-
sumably later time than the power which brings it about, not all radical powers theorists would agree: 
Mumford and Anjum (2011) for instance argue that the action of  powers involved in causation is sim-
ultaneous.  Therefore, it is open to the radical power theorist to assume that premiss 2., if  m ontoloxiv -
gically depend upon POT[m](x), then m exists at t in virtue of  POT[m](x) existing at t’, holds, but that 
t=t’ and thus productive dependence is synchronic. Note that the fact that m and POT[m](x) occur at 
different times plays no role in Friebe’s argument: it relies, rather, on the fact that x exists at t is due to 
the fact that x exists simpliciter and on the fact that something brought it about.   
 Thirdly, accepting that production involves a cross-temporal ontological dependence and chal-
lenging the viability of  such a notion, or denying the idea that production involves any ontological de-
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pendence of  this kind, undermines Friebe’s argument against the compatibility of  radical powers and 
eternalism, and so there would be no reason to doubt that the two theories are compatible. Therefore, 
for the sake of  argument, I am happy to concede premisses 1. and 2. of  Friebe’s argument and concede 
that the ontological dependence involved in production, as formulated by Friebe, is in good order.  
 We can now return to the rest of  the premisses in Friebe’s argument. Premisses 3-5 should be 
uncontentious (given the somewhat heterodox characterisation of  eternalism given above. I will discuss 
a more standard version of  eternalism in §3). Premiss 3 is the statement of  eternalism made in the 
tensed language. Premiss 4. trivially follows from it, and we can derive 5. if  we accept these two (un-
controversial) rules of  inference for the operators simpliciter, always, and at t.   
A1: 𝒯φ → φ  
A2: Always φ → At t, φ  
So far in Friebe’s argument, so good. The troubles start with premisses 6. and 7. For ease of  exposition, 
dub the former Ground and the latter Incompatible. I think that Ground is at least controversial and 
in need of  more justification, and Incompatible is false, and therefore Friebe’s argument is not sound.  
 It is not obvious that the validly derived premiss 5. Always, 𝒯E!x → at t, E!x entails that at t, E!
x obtains in virtue of  𝒯E!x. We arrived at 5. via purely (temporal) logical means: nothing has been said 
about explanatory or dependence relations captured by ‘because’ or ‘in virtue of ’. A position that 
denies this premiss is perfectly conceivable. Indeed, the eternalist might be tempted to assume these 
two further theses about tense logic:   xv
A3:  ∀t (at t, φ) → Always φ 
A4: Always φ → 𝒯φ 
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Given these two rules, the eternalist could conclude that something is true simpliciter iff  it is true at all 
times. From this, she might be equally tempted to conclude that 𝒯φ obtains in virtue of  the fact that φ 
at all times.  Were this the case, since ‘in virtue of ’ is asymmetric, then it could not be the case that xvi
Ground holds. I do not intend to commit to any of  these claims, I am saying that anybody who intends 
to adopt a radical powers metaphysics should. I simply want to point out that premiss 6. of  Friebe’s 
argument is at least controversial, and we need to be given good arguments before accepting it, thus 
undermining the strength of  his argument.  
 However, Friebe has bigger fishes to fry than justifying Ground in order to guarantee the 
soundness of  his argument: justifying Incompatible. I take that the rationale for adopting Incompat-
ible is some worry about over-determination: if  m existing at t is fully explained or grounded in the fact 
that always m exists simpliciter, then what role is left for y’s existing at t’ to play? In other words, what 
kind of  explanation, ground, or dependency would the productive power yield, given that the manifest-
ation’s existence at t is fully accounted for by Eternalism? However, it is doubtful that these overde-
termination-like worries should raise with regard to the ontological dependence, metaphysical explana-
tion, or grounding involved in cashing out what it means for powers to be productive. Since it is not 
uncontroversial whether the ontological dependency involved in spelling out Production is to be assim-
ilated to one “big-G” grounding, or is rather a “small-g”  relation of  its own right, let’s consider both xvii
cases. Assume that there is but one relation underwriting metaphysical explanation, namely big-G 
grounding. In that case, Incompatible straightforwardly does not hold: [p ∨ q] because [p]. But [p ∨ q] 
also because [q]. Therefore Incompatible fails. Assume, on the contrary, that the ontological depend-
ency involved in production is not grounding, but some other small-g relation, and hence the fact that 
Incompatible does not hold for the grounding doesn’t mean that it must fail also for the this other 
kind of  dependence.   xviii
 First, note that in general, the relations expressed by ‘in virtue of ’ or ‘because’ do not validate 
Incompatible. Consider the following examples:  
i) Exact Truthmaking. ‘∃xFx’ is true because Fa. But ‘∃xFx’ is also true because Fb. 
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ii) Property Realisation. Assume that a property (or state) P is multiply realisable, and is realised by 
both F and G. Then, there is P because G occurred, and yet there is P because F occurred. Note 
that there is no reason to think that multiple realisation cannot occur for token properties or states, 
too (e.g. see Horgan 1993). Note that P might be the manifestation of  some power.   
iii) Causal Explanation.  The death of  the prisoner is fully causally explained by John’s shot to the xix
heart. However, the death of  the prisoner is also fully causally explained by Jill’s shot to the head: 
they were both excellent marksmen in the firing squad. So, e because of  c, but also e because of  c*. 
Over-determination surely occurs (at least sometimes) in causation and causal explanations. The 
contentious point is whether systematic overdetermination is plausible, not whether it can obtain.  xx
Matters become even more difficult for Incompatible if  we take the dependence expressed by ‘in vir-
tue of ’ to be transitive: it becomes extremely easy to generate counterexamples. Consider:  
iv)  Constitution. Assuming that constitution is transitive and Constitution as Identity is not true, then it 
is possible that the xxs (fully) compose y does not entail that, for some zz ≠ xx, the zzs do (fully) 
compose y. Thus, y exists because the xxs exist and the xxs compose y, and yet also y exists because 
the zzs exist and the zzs compose y. Since the xxs are not identical to the zzs, Incompatible fails. 
v) Set-formation. {{Socrates}} depends upon {Socrates}. {Socrates} depends upon Socrates. There-
fore, {{Socrates}} depends upon Socrates. Since {Socrates} ≠ Socrates, Incompatible fails.  
vi) Hybrid cases. {Socrates} exists because Socrates does. However, Socrates is also composed by a par-
ticular plurality of  atoms, the xx. Arguably, Socrates exists because the xxs do (and because the xxs 
compose Socrates). Even philosophers who think that these are two distinct ‘small-g’ relations are 
often committed to the idea that these relations can dove-tail, and so that {Socrates} depends upon 
the xxs. Thus, {Socrates} depends upon Socrates. And yet, {Socrates} depends upon the xxs. Un-
less Constitution as Identity holds, Socrates ≠ the xxs, and thus Incompatible is violated. Similar 
cases can be easily drawn with most combinations of  the relations mentioned above.  
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It will be objected that this only shows that Incompatible fails for a number of  small-g relations, not 
that it fails for the ontological dependence relation that Friebe has in mind. However, it would seem 
that the principle fails also for paradigmatic cases of  ontological dependence. Consider the case of  Ar-
istotelian Universals. According to the view, the universal Fness ontologically depends upon its in-
stances: it cannot exist uninstantiated (at some point in time).  Thus, Fness exists because Fa. But also, xxi
Fness exists because b instantiates it: Fness exists because Fb. Therefore Incompatible fails. And this is 
a case of  ontological dependence if  anything is: it is one of  the paradigmatic examples of  the relation, 
even among those that do not take it to be reducible or related to grounding (Barnes 2018).  
 So, it would seem that there are clear cases where Incompatible fails for ontological depend-
ence, as well as for a number of  neighbouring building or small-g relations that are also expressed by 
‘because’ and ‘in virtue of ’. And this, of  course, assuming that there is not a single “big-G” relation that 
covers every case of  dependence.  Therefore, it is far from clear that we ought accept Incompatible xxii
— or, at any rate, doing so would require considerable and controversial assumptions elsewhere, which 
neither the friend of  radical powers nor the eternalist need accept. If  this is the case, then they can re-
ject premiss 7. of  Friebe’s argument. But it is hard to see how we can conclude for the incompatibility 
of  productive radical powers and eternalism unless we endorse Incompatible. Why believe that m’s 
existing at t cannot hold in virtue of  the fact that at t’, POT[m](x) and that m exists simpliciter? If  we 
grant this possibility, then the radical powers theorist ought not be fazed by Friebe’s argument, and has 
no reason to think that Productivity is incompatible with Eternalism.  
 Before moving on to examine whether Dynamism is compatible with Eternalism, I will con-
sider two further objections to the arguments presented above.   xxiii
3. Two Objections and Replies 
The first objection runs as follows: even if  we grant that there radical powers theorists are entitled to 
use the a primitive cross-temporal ontological dependence relation to capture production, this very rela-
tion creates special problems for the eternalist. A non-eternalist can understand productive cross-tem-
poral dependence in tensed terms, as ‘m will exist/occur in virtue of  y existing/occurring (now)’. The 
eternalist, on the other hand, will naturally express the dependence in these terms:  
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Temporal Productive Dependence: at t, x exists in virtue of  [the fact that] at t’, y exists.  
It is customary, for the eternalist, to treat and model times as akin to possible worlds (Sider 2001). If  
this is the case, then a cross-temporal dependence relation should be in all respects similar to a cross-
world dependence relation, such as:  
Modal Productive Dependence: at w, x exists in virtue of  [the fact that] at u, y exists. 
But Modal Dependence looks suspicious — or so the objections goes. Could there be an existential 
dependence across worlds such as the one expressed by Modal Produtive Dependence?   
  The point would deserve an extended discussion that would, unfortunately, take us too far 
afield. As far as I can see, there are two broad strategies that can be adopted: i) show that the temporal 
case is acceptable even if  the modal one is not, or ii) show that the modal case is not problematic, too. I 
will offer a brief  argument for the latter.  
 Start by noting that Modal Productive Dependence is an instance of  the more general:  
MD: at w, A in virtue of  [the fact that] at u, B. 
MD is perfectly acceptable even for the genuine realist. For instance, if  we substitute ◇p to A and p to 
B, we obtain the canonical reduction of  possibility to truth at some world: at w, ◇p in virtue of  the fact 
that at u, p (together with the fact that u is accessible from w). And, of  course, p could be an existence 
claim: at w, ◇∃x (x = Sherlock) in virtue of  the fact that at u, ∃x (x = Sherlock), so that the second re-
latum is an existence claim similar to that of  Modal Productive Dependence. But this, it might be objec-
ted, is not an ontological dependence yet: the first relatum is a possibility, and not an existence, claim. But 
now just consider the existence, at w, of  the fact that Sherlock possibly exists. This fact depends upon 
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the fact that at u, Sherlock exists, plus the usual facts about accessibility relations. So, the following 
holds: at w, [possibly Sherlock exists] obtains (exists) in virtue of  the fact that at u, Sherlock exists.  
 If  for some reason we do not want to introduce facts, think of  the property of  possibly being a 
world-mate of  Sherlock, or being such that possibly Sherlock exists. These properties exist at w in vir-
tue of  the fact that something else is going on at another possible world — e.g. that Sherlock exists at 
u. So, it would seem that cross-world existential dependence relations are perfectly acceptable, even by 
Lewisian lights. So, if  cross-temporal dependence claims for the eternalist are in all respects like cross-
world dependence claims, and the latter are sometimes admissible, so should be the former. The objec-
tion would deserve a more thorough treatment, but it seems that prima facie there is no reason to think 
that, even if  the eternalist considers times in analogy with possible worlds, she should think that the 
cross-temporal ontological dependence relations involved in production are especially problematic.  
The second objection concerns the way in which I have formulated Eternalism, and therefore Friebe’s 
argument, using temporal logic. The objection, in a nutshell, is this: ‘You have formulated Eternalism in 
non-standard terms — it is contentious whether this is a good way to express the position. Therefore, 
you have not yet shown that productive powers are compatible with eternalism: rather, you have shown 
that they are compatible with Correia and Rosenkranz’s brand of  Eternalism. But what about those 
who do not like the view? Furthermore, that is not the view that Friebe targeted in the first place!’  
 The point is fair. Ordinarily, eternalism is characterised as the view according to which the do-
main is static, there is no privileged present (which does not change), and tensed locutions have tense-
less truth conditions — that is to say, the most fundamental and joint carving ideology does not include 
tense operators or tensed terms (see Sider, 2001: 14; Dyke 2003: 66). We can therefore characterise 
‘Tenseless Eternalism’ by substituting the last clause:   
d. Tense operators do not change the truth-value of  any existential claim: Always, for every x, x Always 
exists. In other words, what exists simpliciter never changes 
with the more standard:  
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d*. Tensed language does not reflect the way in which reality is; tensed language can be given tenseless 
truth conditions and is not joint-carving.  
Friebe’s argument against the compatibility of  productive powers and Tenseless Eternalism, in its bare 
bones, runs as follows:  
1. If  Tenseless Eternalism is true, then there is no fundamental tensed phenomena.  
2. If  there is no fundamental tensed phenomena, there is no genuine ontological dependence. 
3. If  there is no genuine ontological dependence, then there are no productive powers. 
4. Therefore, Tenseless Eternalism is not compatible with productive powers.  
Premise 1. just is d*, and premise 3. just is Productivity. So, the crucial and contentious premise is 2. 
Friebe (2018: 86) justifies it as follows: ‘Dispositions would be powerless if  they existed merely per-
spectively at t… For, then, their manifestations would likewise exist merely perspectively at t’… and, 
hence, both the dispositions and their manifestations would be “given” anyway, i.e. they would equally 
exist simpliciter’. Perspectival existence is defined as follows: ‘event e exists in a perspectival sense of  exist-
ence, i.e. (tenselessly) as of  given p iff  it is located at p or at some p’ within or on the (so-called) past 
light cone of  p.’ (Friebe 201: 80). So, the point here is that the eternalist can say that m does not exists 
as of  t (before it is produced by the power) but exists as of  t’ (after it’s been produced by the power), 
but existence as of  merely concerns location and not genuine existence. This is in line with Sider’s (2001: 
59) view: ‘“Exists‐at” is analogous to the spatial predicate “is located at”, not the logician’s “∃”’. For 
genuine existence, we need a change in the domain, of  existence simpliciter. To reinforce this point, 
Friebe maintains that ‘if  a necessitates (or, is a tendency for) b, b cannot exist “anyway”… Rather, b 
only is located at its time t … when necessitated or successfully …brought about’ (Friebe 2018: 87).  
 I can see two ways to spell out the justification for premise 2. more precisely. The first is that 
genuine ontological dependence requires a dynamical change of  the domain — for a to genuinely pro-
duce b and therefore for b to genuinely ontologically depend upon a, there must be a time where b does 
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not exist simpliciter and a time where it does (this is what it takes for a’s productive action to be product-
ive: an expansion of  the domain). This seems to be what Friebe has in mind when he writes that ‘ac-
cording to growing block and presentism, the present comes successively into existence simpliciter. 
(Only) this can be turned into a productive succession by dispositions’ (2018: 88).  
 The other way to spell out the justification of  premise 2. involves, once again, the overde-
termination of  explanation— that is, an invocation of  Incompatible. The idea would be that a cannot 
be said to genuinely produce b, if  b “already” exists simpliciter. Conversely, b cannot be said to genuinely 
depend for its existence upon a’s brining it about, if  b exists simpliciter in virtue of  its being “already” 
located at some region of  spacetime: ‘the dependence of  the particular manifestation on the particular 
disposition allegedly is merely perspectival, whereas from God’s eye — considered to be the truly eter-
nalist ‘perspective’ — everything, every disposition together with every manifestation, exists 
simpliciter’ (Friebe 2018: 87).  
 I think that both these justifications for premise 2. are unsatisfactory, and that therefore we 
have no reason to accept premise 2. I have already argued against Incompatible in the previous sec-
tion: the fact that b exists (simpliciter) in virtue of  its being located somewhere in spacetime does not 
mean that it is not the case that b exists (simpliciter) in virtue of  its being produced by a: there is no reas-
on to think that ontological dependence cannot be overdetermined.  
 Similarly, it is not the case that genuine ontological dependence requires fundamental tense, or 
an unrestricted domain that changes over time. There are perfectly good cases of  genuine ontological 
dependence (let alone grounding or truthmaking) that occur between abstract entities: for instance, 
{{∅}} ontologically depends upon {∅}. Since pure sets lie outside time and space, a fortiori it cannot 
be the case that temporal modifications of  the domain or ‘temporary non-existence simpliciter’ are ne-
cessary conditions for there being ontological dependence: surely, dependency relation among abstract 
entities have nothing to do with tense, and pure set theory would remain unfazed by inhabiting a 
presentist or an eternalist world: it just does not concerns anything in space and time. But if  this is the 
case, then it seems dubious that genuine ontological dependence requires a dynamical expansion of  the 
domain: there is never a time when {∅} exists and {{∅}} does not, and yet the latter depends upon 
the former. 
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 If  premise 2. should not be accepted, then it is not the case that productive powers are incom-
patible with Tenseless Eternalism. Therefore, I conclude that, barring a more convincing justification 
for premise 2. or Incompatible, the productive aspect of  radical powers do not raise particular prob-
lems with either Eternalism à la Correia and Rosenkranz (characterised with tense operators) or Tense-
less Eternalism à la Dyke or Sider.  
4. Dynamism and Processes  
We can now focus on the other thesis that characterises radical powers theories, namely that powers-
worlds are dynamic and active. It is not easy to formulate in precise terms what it does mean for the 
world to be active and dynamical: radical powers theorists often formulate the thesis in negative terms, 
conveying the idea that the picture of  the world they have in mind is unlike the mechanistic world of  
Cartesian physics, where all motion and change in produced by forces external to the objects involved. 
For instance, Ruth Groff  (ms.) states that ‘to say that things in the world have causal powers (‘thing’ as 
a count noun) is to say that things engage in activity, are able to do, and not just to be. Reality, we might 
say (from this perspective) is thus genuinely, irreducibly, non-metaphorically dynamic’.  
 In the present context, it might be tempting to interpret the thesis the that the world is non-
metaphorically dynamic as entailing that what is the case simpliciter changes over time, along the lines of  
Correia & Rosenkranz (2018):  
DYN: Sometimes, ∃p Sometimes (𝒯p & Sometimes, ¬𝒯p).  
DYN is the negation of  the static view that underwrites eternalism. Therefore, if  we were to under-
stand the radical powers theorist’s commitment to a dynamic world to be a commitment to DYN, their 
ontology would be trivially incompatible with eternalism.  
 However, I do not think that, when radical powers theorists talk about a dynamic world, they 
have anything like DYN in mind: they are, rather, concerned with the role of  objects in change: the key 
intuition is that objects are not, at least sometimes, merely lumps of  matter being pushed around by 
something from without, but are rather the source of  change, and are responsible for change: ‘things 
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engage in activity, are able to do, and not just to be’ (Groff  ms.; see Ellis’s (2002) talk of  ‘anti-passivist 
ontologies). The kind of  dynamism that radical powers theorists have in mind is not concerned with a a 
variations of  what is true simpliciter over time, but rather with how objects are involved in change. I will 
therefore exclude that thesis D. entails DYN and therefore the trivially entails the incompatibility of  
radicals powers ontologies with eternalism.  
 How are we to understand dynamism, then? If  dynamic powers are to be active sources of  
change, then they cannot be merely pushed around by their causes. The activation and action of  a 
power cannot simply be the result of  an external force or stimulus applied to it. This thought is cap-
tured by Martin’s (2008: 48-51) mutual disposition partners model for powers interaction, according to 
which powers act by coming together as equals, which is widely accepted amongst radical powers theorists 
(see Mumford and Anjum 2011; 2016; 2018a, Groff  2013). Mumford and Anjum suggest that this 
coming together of  mutual disposition partners should be thought in terms of  a process: ‘we see causa-
tion as an unfolding process whereby a turns into b (as in Martin 2008: ch. 5). The combined powers of  
the cause... become the effect... as part of  what it is to be those powers’ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 
119). So, I propose that the adoption of  thesis D. concerning dynamism involves giving a central role to 
processes in accounts of  change and causation.  
 Radical powers theorists are not wholly explicit on what they take processes to be. However, the 
key characteristic seems to be that processes are changing, dynamic entities at heart: they are temporally 
extended entities that are not composed out of  static, changeless parts. They are active all the way 
down:  
Processes are seen as dynamic in the sense that change is undergone throughout the process, which means it is 
to be found in any part of  it, and it thus cannot be broken down in a string of  changeless parts’ (Mumford & 
Anjum 2011: 116) 
We can isolate the following three key features  of  process that powers invoke. Note that these feaxxiv -
tures underdetermine the metaphysics of  processes, and thus are compatible with both the most com-
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mon theories of  processes currently on the market, namely the ‘stuff ’ view (Mourelatos 1978, Crowth-
er 2011; 2018) and the ‘occurrent continuant’ view (Stout 2016, Steward 2015):  xxv
I. Processes are irreducible to sequences of  events.  
II. Processes are essentially temporally extended (Mumford 2009: 229).  
III. The part of  a process is itself  as active as the process itself  (Mumford & Anjum 2011: 116).  
This last point can be made more precise by saying that radical powers theorists subscribe to the idea 
that processes are homoeomerous, that is, like-parted. This means that the following principle holds of  
them: 
HM: If  it is true that a was φ-ing between t1 and t2 then a was φ-ing during any subinterval Δ between 
t1 and t2.  
HM is quite commonly invoked in the process literature (Mourelatos 1978, Galton and Mizoguchi 
2009, Hornsby 2012; 2015, Steward 2013, Stout 1998; 2016, Crowther 2018) and is meant to capture 
one fundamental difference between processes and events. The proper part of  an event is not the same 
event: ‘an event E is not made up of  E-events: the capsizing of  a boat is not made up of  boat-capsizing’ 
(Mourelatos 1978: 430). On the other hand, this is exactly what seems to go on in the case of  pro-
cesses: if  there is an ongoing process of  strolling from, say, midday till 2 pm, then there is the same 
strolling also between midday and 1 pm. This is made particularly apparent if  we think, with Mourela-
tos (1978), that processes are the kind of  thing that are picked out by the nominalisation of  imperfect-
ive or progressive predications.  xxvi
 Note that this does not mean that processes have to be homoeomerous in the sense that every 
interval has to be indistinguishable from any other, and not composed of  qualitatively different sub-
processes (this would be what Crowther (2011) calls ‘Homogeneity’) – we don’t have to think that pro-
cesses could only be like the uniform motion of  a body as described in Newtonian physics. Processes 
can be varied and have different stages – different things happen when I am digesting, say: mastication 
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is quite different from the action of  hydrochloric acid and pepsin in the stomach. However, there is a 
sense in which the same process is developing in both occasions, and at each moment is true simpliciter that 
I am digesting, even if  digestion is made of  quite different sub-processes. This is particularly important 
for the powers theorist, if  she wants to understand causal processes along the lines of  Mumford and 
Anjum’s “sweet solution” (2011:121).  
 Furthermore, note that HM, when paired with II. the assumption that processes are essentially 
temporally extended, entails I. that processes are irreducible to sequences of  events. By itself  this is 
consistent with there being a lower bound in the division of  temporal regions and temporally extended 
objects – we can consistently accept both I. and HM and yet reject the idea that time is an ‘atomless 
gunk’ (Lewis 1991: 20); all we require is that the temporal atoms are not point-sized, but rather are ex-
tended simple regions: Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006) offer a spatial parallel. I take it that eternal-
ism is perfectly neutral on the topology and structure of  time: an eternalist should be allowed to think 
that time is either discrete, merely dense, continuous, or even gunky, and think that temporal atoms be 
either extended simple regions or point-sized. This latter option is unavailable to the radical powers 
theorist who takes processes to be fundamental. This loss of  neutrality is not a great cost: it merely 
shows that eternalism is compatible with a number of  different other metaphysical theories; but once 
you embrace one, some flexibility will be inevitably lost.   
 Arguments concerning the compatibility of  radical dynamic powers with the metaphysics of  
times should therefore focus on whether the existence of  processes of  the kind described above is 
compatible with the features of  the various theories, or that an account of  change which makes use of  
such processes is. This is far from obvious; Backmann (2018) takes powers metaphysics’ commitment 
to processes as the key element in his argument against the compatibility of  powers presentism, for in-
stance. However, it is eternalism that interests us here, and so the question is whether irreducible pro-
cesses can be accommodated in an eternalist framework.    
5. Argument from Change  
Donatella Donati (2018) has recently offered an argument to the effect that radical powers metaphysics 
are incompatible with eternalism based on the fact that eternalism entails an account of  change that is 
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incompatible with the one delivered by powers.  Although she does not frame her argument specificxxvii -
ally in terms of  processes, her argument relies on the idea that the eternalist’s account of  change re-
duces it to a sequence of  static events, and hence can easily be adapted to target the compatibility of  
processes and eternalism. What follows is an adaptation of  Donati’s (2018) argument.  
 The argument starts by noting that it is extremely common for eternalists to subscribe to Rus-
sell’s account of  change, according to which ‘change is the difference, in respect of  truth and false-
hood, between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the same 
entity and another time T*’ (Russell 1903, sect. 442). As Sider (2001: 212) notes, ‘for someone like Rus-
sell who accepts he B-theory of  time (eternalism + the reducibility of  tense), this is the natural account 
of  change’. McTaggart (1927, chapter XXXIII, sections 315-6) as well as many after him (e.g. Mellor 
1981, Simons 1987) famously argued that this is no account of  change, because there is no change at all. 
This because, on the one hand it does not involve the modification of  any fact – it is always true that 
the poker is hot on Monday and cold on Tuesday – and on the other hand it is too similar to spatial 
variation (Sider 2001: 212-6).   
 The most common answer to these objections on the part of  the eternalist is just to double 
down on the Russellian analysis, and then accuse the critics of  begging the question. This strategy is 
perfectly exemplified by Sider: ‘the objections may simply be met head-on. Change is analogous to spa-
tial variation. Change does occur in virtue of  unchanging facts about temporal parts. There are no good 
arguments on the contrary’ (Sider 2001: 214). As a result of  this dialectical situation, we can take the 
eternalist to define change along the Russellian analysis:  
RA: An object a changing from being F to being G =df  There is a time t such that a is F at t and there is 
a time t’ such that t<t’ and a is G at t’.  
Donati argues that RA is not compatible with powers metaphysics – in our case, in virtue of  the fact 
that it is not compatible with a process ontology. The problem is not that RA employs instantaneous 
moments – the eternalist’s reductive theory of  change, despite being normally formulated in terms of  
instants, need not be: we could be employing intervals, or treat t as an extended simple region of  time.  
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 The problem is, rather, that according to radical powers theories, it is powers that are responsible 
for change and they bring it about by being exercised, which results in a continuous process unfolding 
until it reaches its natural endpoint. Powers theorists such as Mumford and Anjum would say that for a 
to change from F to G means that F is a power that a has at some time t which, when exercised results 
in the unfolding of  some process of  φ-ing, whose natural endpoint is that a is G (at some later time t’). 
So change is to be explained in terms of  the process that takes place as a result of  the coming together 
of  powers, first and foremost. Recall that radical power theorists are committed to the idea that pro-
cesses cannot be reduced to sequences of  static events or facts. But this is exactly all there is to change, 
according to RA. We can spell out the argument more precisely as follows:  
1. Eternalism entails the Russellian reductive account of  change, RA. 
2. RA: An object a changing from being F to being G = <Fa at t, Ga at t’> such that t<t’.  
3. If  RA is true, change can be analysed as a sequence of  events or states of  affairs. 
4. Radical powers metaphysics are committed to the idea that change occurs in virtue of  the unfold-
ing of  a process.  
5. Processes cannot be reduced to a sequence of  events or ordered series of  states of  affairs.  
6. Change can be analysed as a sequence of  events (3) and cannot be analysed as a sequence of  events 
(5). ↯ 
This argument only poses a challenge to radical powers theorists who accepts i) that powers are dynam-
ic, and ii) that this dynamism is to be cashed out in terms of  irreducible processes. Moderate power 
theorists can help themselves to RA without any problem and reject that processes are anything over 
and above a sequence of  events or states of  affairs (Williams 2019). However, my aim is to show that 
also radical powers metaphysics are compatible with Eternalism, so it will not do to abandon processes. 
Fortunately, I do not think that moderate is the only response to Donati’s argument: there is a way to 
defuse the argument that is available also to radical powers theorists. Donati’s argument stems only 
from the fact that RA is a reductive account of  change. I will suggest that the radical powers theorist 
should try to resist premiss 1: eternalism does not entail a commitment to a Russellian reductive ac-
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count of  change. Although the two views are commonly associated, the reason for taking them as a 
package is merely dialectical.  
 Start by noting that RA is ambiguous between a description of  the phenomenon and its explana-
tion. We are tempted to think that the right-hand side of  the principle is what explains the left-hand side – 
that the left-hand side reduces to it. But this would be a mistake. Eternalism entails RA only insofar as 
it is understood as a materially adequate description of  the phenomenon of  change: considering it a (reduct-
ive) explanation of  change is a further, quite independent thesis.   
 The point that I would like to get across is that we should distinguish between a modest – that 
is, descriptive – reading of  RA, and an ambitious, reductive one. Eternalism surely offers the resources 
to describe change in terms of  a sequence of  property-instantiation, e.g. as an ordered pair of  states of  
affairs such as <Fa at t, Ga at t’>, but that does only commit the eternalism to maintain that a certain 
biconditional holds:  
RAD : An object a changing from being F to being G iff  there is a time t such that a is F at t and there is 
a time t’ such that t<t’ and a is G at t’. 
This only tell us how we can represent change from an eternalist perspective. And surely, such represent-
ation of  change gets something right: even the most radical powers theorist would concede that the 
ordered pair <Fa at t, Ga at t’> captures something of  change. What the radical powers theorist denies is 
that such picture tells us the full story about change: a fully satisfying description and explanation will have 
to involve powers, processes, and so on. But it doesn’t mean that the minimal scheme offered by RAD 
cannot be enriched or is incompatible with powers. What she must reject is this further thesis, which 
represents a reductive explanation of  change and which we should sharply distinguish from RAD 
RAE: An object a changing from being F to being G iff  and (fully) in virtue of there is a time t such that a 
is F at t and there is a time t’ such that t < t’ and a is G at t’. 
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It is only this latter, stronger principle which is incompatible with powers accounts of  change, because 
it asserts that there is nothing more to change than such variation of  properties. But this is an extra step: 
nothing in the doctrine of  eternalism by itself  forces us to go down this path. Compare this with the 
situation in which the perdurantist is in:  
Lewis formulates perdurantism as the view that ‘‘something... persists by having different temporal parts, or 
stages, at different times.’’ (1986: 202) Crucially, this formulation includes the ‘by’-locution, which indicates an 
explanatory claim—to say that an object persists by having temporal parts is to say that facts about persistence 
are grounded in, or obtain in virtue of, facts about temporal parts. This conception of  perdurantism goes bey-
ond the ontological account since ontological claims are not, by themselves, explanatory... it is one thing to say 
that persisting objects have temporal parts whenever they exist; it is another thing to say that objects persist be-
cause they have temporal parts. One can accept the first claim while denying the second, so the explanatory idea 
goes beyond the ontological. (Wasserman 2016: 244-5). 
  
A radical power theorist who subscribes to the view of  processes sketched in the previous section 
should have no problem with the idea that we can speak of  the parts of  a process: surely it must be 
possible to distinguish between, for instance, an early stage and an advanced stage of  a process, e.g. the 
rotting of  an apple or the dissolving of  the sugar. Even if  we think of  causation as an ‘unfolding pro-
cess whereby a turns into b’, we must be able to say that at a certain time or interval the water was less 
sweet, and at a later time or interval it was sweeter as a result of  the dissolving of  a cube of  sugar.   
Therefore process theorists can describe a process in terms of  a series of  a succession of  states of  af-
fairs. What they cannot say is that such succession of  states of  affairs tells the whole story about the pro-
cess – that processes are nothing over and above such series, and thus cannot adopt a reductive explanation 
of  change along the lines of  RAE. But, according to the power theorist, we can enrich RAD and formu-
late a more adequate account of  change by adding elements from her metaphysics.  
 Here is a sketched proposal as how a radical powers theorists might improve on RAD. Mumford 
and Anjum argue that causation by powers is best represented not by neuron diagrams, but rather by 
vectors in quality spaces. The idea, in short, is that we take manifestations to be locations on a certain 
quality space – for ease of  exposition, limit the example to one-dimensional quality spaces, e.g. hot and 
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cold. We then represent the current state of  the object with regard to the quality space as a vertical line: 
this would be the current temperature of  the object. We then represent its powers in action as vectors 
moving in a direction: the powers to heat as vectors pointing in one direction, and the powers to cool 
as vectors pointing in the opposite direction.   
 Importantly, Mumford and Anjum recognise that such a diagram only represents a moment:  
The vectors depicted within a quality space are meant to indicate how things dispose in that particular situation. 
The vectors represent only the operating dispositions but the model does not show, for instance, any actual 
change or movement within that quality space (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 26).   
Assuming that the quality space is one-dimensional and the two poles are, respectively, F and G, that we 
represent directedness by introducing a primitive operator ‘⇀’ such that ‘P⇀F’ is read as ‘P tends to F’, 
and finally that we can associate a real number to the intensity or degree of  a power, we can represent a 
situation in a vector space where there are two powers disposing, respectively, toward F and G as fol-
lows: nP⇀F, mP*⇀G. We can then represent a change in the vector space as an ordered pair of  such 
situations – consistently with RAD. For instance, we can represent an increase in the intensity of  one of  
the powers and a decrease in the other as <(nP⇀F, mP*⇀G), (n+1P⇀F, m-1P*⇀G)>. This gives us the 
evolution of  a situation with two conflicting powers where one power becomes stronger and the other 
weakens. To simplify, assume that there is just one power in action, increasing in intensity. We can then 
offer the following improved description of  change:  
RAD+: An object a changing from being disposed toward F to being more disposed toward F iff 
<(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> 
 The radical power theorist will still think that this is not enough – that there is more to change 
that this. As suggested in §3, what we need is that the two elements of  the ordered pair be connected 
by a primitive process. But we can simply add this requirement to our description. As a first stab, we just 
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need to add the clause that there is the relevant process between the two relevant instants that has all 
three the required features I-III. Informally, we can just say that some entity a undergoes change iff  a is 
disposed thus-and-so at some time t, has some different disposition at some later time t’, and there is a 
irreducible, essentially extended, and homoeomerous process φ involving a which takes place between t 
and t’. More formally, we can depict what is going on as something like this:  
RAD++ An object a changing from being disposed toward F to being more disposed toward F iff 
<(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> & there is (the right kind of) process φ such that there is φ-ing between 
t and t’, and φ is such that if  it is true that a was φ-ing between t1 and t2 then a was φ-ing during any 
subinterval Δ between t1 and t2, φ is essentially extended, and φ is irreducible to sequences of  events.  
This description is an unlovely mouthful but seems, prima facie, to be quite close to what radical powers 
theorists think is going on in cases of  causation (in this case, in case of  an increase in intensity in the 
tendency to F). This representation of  change is perfectly consistent with RAD: it just contains more 
elements than those that would be available to any eternalist, for it requires the ontological toolkit which 
comes with radical powers. But this should come as no surprise: after all, eternalism is not a theory of  
properties, but merely of  time. We should expect that a better description can be afforded by an integ-
rated theory of  time, powers, processes, etc. Assuming that something like RAD++  is a more adequate 
description of  change for the radical power theorist, she can then offer an account of  change in the fol-
lowing terms:  
RAE++ An object a changing from being disposed toward F to being more disposed toward F iff and 
fully in virtue of  <(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> & there is (the right kind of) process φ such that there is 
φ-ing between t and t’, such that there is φ-ing between t and t’, and φ is such that if  it is true that a was 
φ-ing between t1 and t2 then a was φ-ing during any subinterval Δ between t1 and t2, φ is essentially 
extended, and φ is irreducible to sequences of  events. 
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 Why do so many eternalists take the extra step from RAD to RAE? Recall the turn of  phrase 
employed by Sider: ‘for someone like Russell who accepts he B-theory of  time (eternalism + the redu-
cibility of  tense), this is the natural account of  change’ (Sider 2001). There is no entailment between 
the two – strictly speaking, one is free to adopt the former without the latter. I can see two reasons to 
run them together, neither of  which binding. The first, and weakest one, is purely dialectic: by doubling 
down on a reductive account of  change, the eternalist can simply reject McTaggart’s no-change objec-
tion by insisting that the A-theorist is begging the question against eternalism. From a purely dialectical 
point of  view, I have nothing to object to the strategy. But, of  course, we are not forced to go down 
this path. The eternalist could also show that she can give a richer account of  change, one perhaps 
closer to the kind of  story that the A-theorist feels entitled to hear, like RAE++.   
 The most appealing aspect of  RAE is that it offers the resources to reply to the A-theorist 
without having to appeal to any other metaphysical theory: all the resources for responding to McTag-
gart are already available to the eternalist. But this is a positive aspect only if  we are proceeding in our 
metaphysical investigation piecemeal, and we want each theory to be self-sufficient and amenable to be 
combined with every other theory in other areas of  metaphysics. But this is not our current situation: 
we are starting by assuming a certain view of  properties and causation. So there is no reason to appeal 
to the tools offered by eternalism alone to respond to the critiques of  the A-theorist: we can invoke 
powers and processes, too! Assuming that the appeal to processes does manage to cash out the relevant 
notion of  dynamism, I suspect that radical powers theorists could develop precisely the richer account 
of  change that the A-theorist is seeking. The only reason to go for RAE is dialectical: eternalists needed 
a way to dismantle McTaggart’s objection. But such a consideration carries little weight in a different 
dialectical context, one in which a radical powers ontology is presupposed. 
 If  we can reject premiss 1. of  Donati’s argument, we can easily escape the contradiction. If  so, 
we have been offered no reason to think that eternalism is incompatible with radical powers metaphys-
ics.   
6. Conclusions 
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Proving conclusively that two metaphysical theories are compatible is a hard task – indeed, it might be 
not unlike an attempt to verify a theory, be it empirical or not. As in any other area of  philosophy, new 
arguments can always crop up and undermine doctrines and connections thought to be on secure 
ground. Therefore, it would be rushed to conclude that it has been proved for good that radical powers 
metaphysics is compatible with eternalism. Ingenious Humeans will probably come up with further ar-
guments, which will need to be rebutted in order to give Neo-Aristotelianism a chance. But, until then, 
I think that friends of  powers should be warranted to hold the defeasible belief  that powers can be em-
bedded in an eternalist framework, and that powers theorists can take full benefit from the resources 
offered by such a theory of  time for their own purposes (see Vetter 2015: 186-193). 
 Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics in general and powers ontologies in particular are still relatively 
underdeveloped and far from seriously threatening the Neo-Humean orthodoxy. Showing that they can 
avail themselves of  a popular metaphysics of  time will not, on is own, vindicate the paradigm and force 
Humeans to abandon their framework. But it is an important step nevertheless – at least, it shows that 
powers are not worse off  when it comes to at least one theory of  time: the crucial battle will have to be 
fought on other grounds.   
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 See, inter alios, Bird (2007), Ellis (2001), Groff  & Greco (2013), Jacobs (2017), Marmodoro (2010), Martin (2008), Molnar i
(2003), Mumford (2004), Mumford & Anjum (2011), Vetter (2015), Williams (2019). 
 By this I mean either offer a novel and more convincing account of  these phenomena, or more modestly just adopt the ii
existing theories. 
 I have reached the conclusion that powers ontology is compatible with Eternalism independently although iii
contemporaneously with Andrea Roselli. Unfortunately, I came across his work too late in the publication pro-
cess and could not take his arguments into consideration.
 It would be best to distinguish between powers and dispositions, for a number of  reasons: it seems that our usage of  ‘disiv -
positions’ only corresponds to powers with relatively high degree (Vetter 2015: §2-3), and that in general talk of  dispositions 
is available to everyone, including the Humean (Azzano 2019). However, since Friebe (2018) speaks of  powers and disposi-
tions interchangeably, it would be artificial to distinguish between these terms while discussing his argument. Nothing of  
substance depends on this lack of  terminological fineness of  grain, for the purposes of  this paper. 
 This does not need to be in the future. E.g. Vetter (2015) admits certain powers whose manifestation lies in the past, and v
Mumford and Anjum (2011) only admit of  powers whose manifestation is simultaneous with the exercise of  the power. 
 Bird (2016) takes modal fixity to be the defining features of  powers, but that is too weak. Also someone who accepts a vi
governing conception of  laws along the lines of  the DTA account, but happens to think that the Necessitation second or-
der relation (to give an example in terms of  Armstrong 1997) is necessary as a brute fact will agree that properties have their 
nomic/modal profile modally fixed, but is not thereby a power theorist. See Azzano 2019 for an argument to the effect that 
realism about powers must be formulated in hyperintensional terms, such as essence or grounding. 
 There is a long literature of  attempts to such reduction or analysis, and an equally long literature of  arguments for their vii
failures. For some relatively recent discussion see Wasserman & Manley (2011), Vetter (2015). 
 This amounts to saying that the following principle holds essentially of  powers qua powers:  viii
Independence: For every power X, for every manifestation Y, if  X is directed to Y, it is possible that X obtains and Y does 
not obtain. 
 It is not wholly clear to me that Friebe intends his argument to show the incompatibility of  powers ontologies and eternalism, ix
for he states that he is concerned with powers theories of laws and not of  properties: ‘I should exclude the variant according to 
which the fundamental physical properties such as mass and charge —considered as dispositions— “generate” the regularities 
without any help of  the laws which merely “flow” (Bird 2007, 2) from them’. I must confess that I have a hard time thinking 
of  any example, within the powers literature, of  somebody who takes the laws themselves to be powerful, as opposed to the 
properties themselves. The discussion among friends of  powers is often whether we need laws at all (Mumford 2004, Bird 
2007, Dumsday 2019). I will adapt Friebe’s argument to be targeted at ontologies of  powerful properties, rather than powerful 
laws. 
 This is the symbolism of  Vetter (2015). Note that, by Vetter’s lights, POT[m](x) is not syntactically correct, since she takes x
POT to be a predicate modifier, and m is not a predicate. Strictly speaking, therefore, I should rather form a predicate along 
the lines ‘being such that m obtains’ using λ-calculus. However, since this would make the argument unnecessarily cumber-
some, for the sake of  readability I have preferred to simply use m as argument of  POT. 
 In what follows I largely adopt Correia & Rosenkranz (2018) tense logic. However, unlike them I introduce a dedicated xi
variable t for times. This is just for the sake of  readability. We can easily specify the domain over which these variables range, 
{times} by using their primitive ‘is a time’ predicate, T, as follows: {times} = {x|Tx}.  
 This corresponds to the formulation of  STA in Correia & Rosenkranz (2018). xii
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for suggesting potential difficulties in thinking that there could be xiii
cross-temporal relations of  ontological dependence. 
 This would not be in contrast with the ‘no action at distance’ principle, because in their view a power acts by unfolding in xiv
a process — all action is local. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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 Correia & Rosenkranz (2018: 10) do not incorporate these in their logic, but note that they do so because these are metaxv -
physically contentious, and they aim to provide a theory-neutral logic. However, both should be quite attractive to the Eternalist, 
so there is no reason for her to endorse them as substantial theses. 
 Perhaps this could be understood as a case of  collective grounding not too dissimilar to those discussed by Dasgupta xvi
(2014) with regard to qualitativism and spacetime relationalism. 
 Wilson (2014), Bennett (2017), Paolini-Paoletti (2019). xvii
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for rising this point. xviii
 It might be objected that causation does not belong to the group. However, Bennett (2017) argues that causation is to be xix
associated to other ‘building relations’ among which is most natural to look for the relation expressed by the ‘because’ in 
Friebe’s argument. The main element in her argument is that many building relations bear a diachronic or ‘causal 
taint’ (Bennett 2017: §4). It is quite clear that the notion of  ontological dependence under exam here is tainted in this way: it 
concerns entities that do not need to exist at the same time. Thus, it would be hard to treat causation (and causal explana-
tion) and ontological dependence as utterly alien in this dialectical situation. 
 While most philosophers in the (mental) causation literature agree that systematic causal overdetermination is implausible, their xx
reasons to do so differ (Kim 1998; Melnyk 2003; Yablo 2002), and it is neither obvious nor uncontroversial that they are 
right: see Sider (2003) or Lowe (2003).  
 ‘We certainly should not demand that every universal should be instantiated now...The principle of  instantiation should xxi
be interpreted as ranging over all time’ (Armstrong 2008: 65). 
 See Berker (2018) for a recent argument in favour of  grounding unity. xxii
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of  this journal for raising both these objections xxiii
 Note that I do not include any thesis concerning the telic structure of  processes – i.e. whether they have their “goal” in xxiv
themselves or not. This means that the distinction between process and event does not map the Aristotelian distinction 
between kinesis (movement) and energeia (activity) that readers of  Metaphysics 9.6, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4 will be familiar with, 
nor the classic distinction between processes and achievements (Vendler 1957), understood as the difference between activ-
ities that can go on indefinitely and activities that have an (instantaneous) endpoint. Most processes that power theorists are 
interested in would be achievements, in Vendler’s terms. 
 The main difference between the two theories is that, according to the occurrent continuant views, there is such a thing xxv
as individual processes (e.g. this rotting as opposed to that rotting), whereas this is not the case when it comes to stuff  views. 
 E.g. from ‘Jones was pushing the cart for hours’ we obtain ‘There was pushing of  the cart for hours by John’. I am not xxvi
suggesting that we infer the existence of  processes in virtue of  the fact that certain languages, including English, have a 
progressive and imperfective verbal aspects. Radical powers theorists assume that there are mind and language independent 
processes; they do not read off  their metaphysics from our language (Heil 2003). It is unclear to me what is the relationship 
between verbal aspect and A and B-theories of  tense: it seems coherent to think that tense is not fundamental and yet as-
pect is, but I have no argument to support this.
 A somewhat similar worry can be detected in Mumford (2009) and Mumford and Anjum (2011), but it is intermingled xxvii
with worries about persistence and not spelled out in much detail, so I will stick to Donati’s argument.  
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